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Abstract—We discuss the relation between fully abstract and
robust compilation (preservation of satisfaction of arbitrary
hyperproperties under adversarial contexts) showing the
former implies some variant of the latter.
Index Terms—fully abstract compilation, secure compilation,
robust preservation, noninterference.
1. Introduction
High-level programming languages provide abstractions
that ease programmers in writing correct and secure code.
However, when compiling to a low-level language and
linking with adversarial target code, such abstractions may
be lost, thus enabling unexpected attacks [9, 10].
Secure compilation [17] devises both principles and proof
techniques to ensure that no more attacks are possible on
compiled programs than those already possible on source
programs. Intuitively, with a secure compiler at hand a
programmer can be sure that the guarantees given by the
source-level abstractions are preserved after compilation.
Let J·K be a compiler from a source language S to a target
T.1 A context C is a program with a hole that models an
active attacker and P is a partial program for which we
would like some guarantee after compilation. Historically,
the first principle for secure compilation to be proposed
was fully abstract compilation (FAC) [1]. We say that
J·K is FAC whenever it preserves and reflects contextual
equivalence, i.e., iff for any P1 and P2
(∀CS.CS [P1] ≈ CS [P2])⇔(∀CT.CT [JP1K] ≈ CT [JP2K])
where ≈ is an equivalence relation capturing the power
of the contexts and may come in different flavors [13].
Recently, Abate et al. [3] proposed the family of so-called
robust criteria, focusing on the preservation of robust
satisfaction of hyperproperties, i.e., their satisfaction under
any adversarial context.2 Let beh(C [P ]) be the set of all
traces that can be observed running C [P ]. A hyperprop-
erty H is a set of sets of execution traces [7], and C [P ]
satisfy H (C [P ] |= H) iff beh(C [P ]) ∈ H . Among all
the robust criteria, in this short paper we consider only
RHPτ˜ [2] that requires that if CS [P] satisfies a source
hyperproperty HS for any CS, then CT [JPK] satisfies its
target interpretation τ˜(HS) for any CT, in symbols
(∀CS. CS [P] |= HS)⇒ (∀CT. CT [JPK] |= τ˜ (HS)).
A natural question concerns the relation between FAC
and RHPτ˜ . FAC has been successfully used to prove the
1. To ease reading we highlight in blue, sans-serif the elements of S,
in red,bold those of T and in black the common ones [15].
2. We refer the reader to [3] for a full overview of all these criteria.
preservation of interesting hyperproperties, like noninter-
ference [5, 6]. However, FAC does not always imply
the preservation of noninterference nor any of the robust
criteria, e.g., when source and target languages share the
same observables and τ˜ is the identity [3, 16]. In this
short paper we briefly describe our preliminary results in
clarifying the relation between FAC and RHPτ˜ in general,
and we outline our next steps at investigating the link
between FAC and the preservation of noninterference.
2. A preliminary answer: FAC vs RHPτ˜
For any comparison to be possible the relation ≈ must
somehow involve observable traces. Therefore, we assume
absence of internal nondeterminism for both S and T, so
that ≈ and ≈ can be replaced by trace equivalence [3, 11].
Hence, C [P1] ≈ C [P2] iff the sets of traces that can be
produced by P1 and P2 in the context C coincide, in
symbols beh(C [P1]) = beh(C [P2]).
In this setting, we provide the best possible target inter-
pretation of hyperproperties, τ˜ , such that if P satisfies HS
in an arbitrary source context, a FAC compiler ensures
that JPK satisfies τ˜(HS) in an arbitrary target context.
Theorem 1. If J·K is FAC then there exists a map τ˜ such
that J·K is RHPτ˜ and is minimal with this property.
The proof, the definition of τ˜ and its minimality can be
found in the appendix.
3. Conclusion and future work
Above, we briefly outlined our preliminary research in
comparing state-of-the-art criteria in secure compilation.
We believe Theorem 1 is a promising step in the right
direction, but still not a definitive answer. Indeed, al-
though minimal, τ˜ could map a source hyperproperty to
the target hyperproperty containing all possible sets of
traces and that is trivially robustly satisfied by all target
programs. Similarly, τ˜ may map a noninterference to an
arbitrary hyperproperty. We are investigating conditions
that ensure instead that noninterference is mapped to a
“noninterference-like” hyperproperty, possibly a declassi-
fication of the same, that could be characterized within the
framework of abstract noninterference [12]. Finally, we
are trying to relax the hypothesis of determinacy to extend
our results to inherently non-deterministic settings, e.g.,
distributed and parallel systems or protocol specification
tools built upon the (applied) pi-calculus [4]. To this end,
and inspired by the hierarchy of Cousot [8], we aim to
define FAC over abstract trace semantics enjoying good
properties, e.g., being fully abstract, and then interpret
FAC in more concrete semantics, e.g., I/O sequences for
which the robust criteria look better suited.
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Appendix
In this appendix we assume S and T are languages
without internal nondeterminism and J·K is a compiler
from source S to target T. Let Trace denote the sets
of traces; ℘(Trace) be the set of trace properties; and
℘(℘(Trace)) of hyperproperties. As said above, in our
setting we can think of FAC as defined as preservation
(“⇒”) and reflection (“⇐”) of equality of trace in arbitrary
contexts:
FAC ≡ ∀P1P2. (∀CS. beh(Cs [P1]) = beh(Cs [P2])) ⇐⇒
(∀CT. beh(CT [JP1K]) = beh(CT [JP2K]))
where beh(C [P ]) = { t | C [P ] t }.
Denote by CtxS andCtxT the classes of source and target
contexts and define the relation
RJ·K⊆ (CtxS → ℘(TraceS)) × (CtxT → ℘(TraceT))
as
fS RJ·K gT ⇐⇒ ∃P. (fS = λCS. beh(CS [P])) ∧
(gT = λCT. beh(CT [JPK])).
In accordance with the result by Parrow [14], stating that
for any FAC compiler there exists an injective mapping
between the equivalence classes of ≈ and those of ≈, we
prove the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. If J·K is FAC, then RJ·K is a partial and
injective function defined over all functions of the form
λCS. beh(CS [P])) for some partial source program P.
Proof. We first show RJ·K is a partial function i.e., that
every element of CtxS → ℘(TraceS) is related at most
with one element of CtxT → ℘(TraceT). Assume
fS RJ·K g
1
T
and fS RJ·K g
2
T
. By definition,
∃P1. (fS = λCS. beh(CS
[
P
1
]
)) ∧
(g1
T
= λCT. beh(CT
[q
P
1
y]
)) (1)
and
∃P2. (fS = λCS. beh(CS
[
P
2
]
)) ∧
(g2
T
= λCT. beh(CT
[q
P
2
y]
)) (2)
Notice now that the same fS appears in both Equation 1
and Equation 2, thus for an arbitrary Cs, fS =
beh(CS [P1]) = beh(CS [P2]). So, it must be that
∀CS. beh(CS [P1]) = beh(CS [P2])
and by (preservation direction of) FAC
∀CT. beh(CT [JP1K]) = beh(CT [JP2K])
meaning that g1
T
and g2
T
are point-wise equal.
We now show injectivity of RJ·K . Let
f
1
S = λCS. beh(CS [P1])
f
2
S = λCS. beh(CS [P2])
with f1
S
6= f1
S
then, there exists some CS such that
beh(CS [P1]) 6= beh(CS [P2]). By the (contrapositive of)
reflection in the definition of FAC we deduce there exists
CT such that beh(CT [JP1K]) 6= beh(CT [JP2K]) which
implies RJ·K (f
1
S
) 6= RJ·K (f
2
S
) and RJ·K is injective.
Abate et al. [2] define τ˜ : ℘(TraceS) → ℘(TraceT) and
then lift it to ℘(℘(TraceS))→ ℘(℘(TraceT)). We define
instead directly τ˜ : ℘(℘(TraceS)) → ℘(℘(TraceT)). If
one is willing to specialize it to trace properties this can
be done by τ˜ (piS) = τ˜ ({piS}). Finally, we can show
Theorem 1. If J·K is FAC then there exists a map τ˜ such
that J·K is RHPτ˜ and is minimal with this property.
Proof. By definition, if CS [P] |= HS there exists piCS ∈ HS
such that beh(CS [P]) = piCS . By Lemma A.1, RJ·K is
defined on the following function:
fPHS : CtxS → ℘(TraceS)
fPHS = λCS. piCS
and by definition of RJ·K , for every target context CT
beh(CT [JPK]) = ((RJ·K fPHS) CT).
Thus, JPK satisfies the following target hyperproperty{
((RJ·K f
P
HS
) CT)
∣∣ CT ∈ CtxT}
in an arbitrary target context CT.
Let
τ˜ (HS) =
{{
((RJ·K (f
P
HS
)) CT)
∣∣ CT ∈ CtxT} if ∃P. ∀CS. Cs [P] |= HS
∅ o.w.
J·K is RHPτ˜ for such a τ˜ by construction.
We now show minimality of τ˜ i.e., that for every α such
that RHPα, ∀HS ∈ ℘(℘(TraceS)). τ˜ (HS) ⊆ α(HS).
If τ˜ (HS) = ∅ then ∅ ⊆ α(HS). If piT ∈ τ˜(HS), then
by construction piT = beh(C
′
T
[JPK]) for some C′
T
and
some P such that ∀CS. CS [P] |= HS. By RHP
α de-
duce ∀CT. CT [JPK] |= α(HS) and hence in particular
C′
T
[JPK] |= α(HS) that means piT = beh(C′T [JPK]) ∈
α(HS) and concludes the proof.
